Beyond Idealism: The EU's Pragmatic Approach in Foreign Policy Towards Türkiye and Russia

İdealizmin Ötesinde: AB'nin Türkiye ve Rusya'ya Yönelik Dış Politikasında Pragmatik Yaklaşım

Mustafa Turgut DEMİRTEPE

Assoc. Prof. Çanakkale Onsekiz Mart University, Biga Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of International Relations, ORCID: 0000-0001-6191-5085, Email: mtdemirtepe@comu.edu.tr

Hakan SAMUR

Prof., Dicle University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Political Science and Public Administration, ORCID: 0000-0003-1980-9347, Email: hsamur@hotmail.com

Abstract

The European Union consistently proclaims its commitment to democratic principles as the normative foundation of its foreign policy, asserting that these values are the primary determinants shaping all external engagements. However, this idealistic and value-oriented rhetoric often stands in stark contrast to the EU's practical conduct, which reflects a supranational actor increasingly governed by strategic calculations. This paper analyzes how such pragmatism manifests in the EU's foreign policy by examining historical and contemporary case studies of its relations with Türkiye and Russia. It argues that the Union's ability to align its actions with geopolitical interests is frequently achieved by masking its underlying pragmatism beneath a discourse of universal values. Despite its avowed adherence to democratic norms, the EU's engagement with these two countries reveals a persistent, interest-based policy architecture. Moreover, the study demonstrates that the EU's pragmatic approach is not a recent development, but rather an inherent and enduring feature of its external diplomacy—one that adapts in form depending on the strategic responses and political postures of the counterpart states.

Keywords: European Union, Türkiye, Russia, Foreign Policy, Principled Pragmatism.

Öz

Avrupa Birliği, dış politikasının normatif temeli olarak demokratik ilkelere bağlılığını sürekli olarak vurgulamakta ve bu değerlerin tüm dış ilişkilerini şekillendiren başlıca belirleyiciler olduğunu iddia etmektedir. Ancak, bu idealist ve değer odaklı söylem, giderek daha fazla stratejik hesaplamalarla yönetilen ulusüstü bir aktör olan AB'nin pratik davranışlarıyla genellikle keskin bir tezat oluşturmaktadır. Bu makale, AB'nin Türkiye ve Rusya ile ilişkilerinin tarihsel ve güncel vaka çalışmalarını inceleyerek, bu tür bir pragmatizmin AB'nin dış politikasında nasıl ortaya çıktığını analiz etmektedir. Makale, Birliğin eylemlerini jeopolitik çıkarlarıyla uyumlu hale getirme yeteneğinin, genellikle evrensel değerler söyleminin altında yatan pragmatizmini maskelemek suretiyle elde edildiğini savunmaktadır. AB'nin demokratik normlara bağlılığını açıkça beyan etmesine rağmen, bu iki ülkeyle olan ilişkileri, çıkar temelli bir politika mimarisinin ısrarlı bir örneğini ortaya koymaktadır. Demokratik normlara bağlılığını açıkça beyan etmesine rağmen, AB'nin bu iki ülkeyle ilişkilerinde ısrarcı, çıkar temelli bir politika yapısı ortaya çıkmaktadır. Ayrıca, bu çalışma AB'nin pragmatik yaklaşımının yeni bir gelişme olmadığını, daha çok dış politikasının içsel ve kalıcı bir özelliği olduğunu ve karşı taraf devletlerin stratejik tepkilerine ve siyasi duruşlarına göre değişebildiğini göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, Rusya, Dış Politika, İlkeli Pragmatizm.

Makale Türü / Article Type	**Başvuru Tarihi / Submitted**	**Kabul Tarihi / Accepted**
Araştırma Makalesi/Research Article	17.11.2025	19.12.2025

Bu makaleye atıf için / To cite this article

Demirtepe, M. T. & Samur, H. (2025). Beyond Idealism: The EU's Pragmatic Approach in Foreign Policy Towards Türkiye and Russia, *Uluslararası Kriz ve Siyaset Araştırmaları Dergisi,* 9(2), 246-263.

Introduction

The concept of pragmatism has been a subject of extensive philosophical discourse, marked by significant contention regarding its precise definition. A.O. Lovejoy's identification of thirteen distinct forms of pragmatism in the early 20th century, coupled with F.S.C. Schiller's assertion that the number of pragmatisms corresponds to the number of pragmatists, underscores the profound diversity within the field (Almeder, 1986: 79). Although not itself a general theory, the application of pragmatism has been central to divergent debates within the domain of international relations, particularly in the context of foreign policy formulation (Bauer and Brighi, 2009; Cochran, 2012).

Without delving into these debates, this article will employ the concept of pragmatism precisely within the framework articulated by the European Union (EU) in its official documentation. The 2016 Global Strategy document, which elaborates on the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy, introduces the concept of "principled pragmatism" as a guiding principle for the EU's future external actions (European External Action Service, 2016). Prior to this, the EU's foundational treaties and foreign policy documents were predominantly characterized by idealistic rhetoric, emphasizing a value-based foreign and security policy grounded in principles such as democracy, human rights, peace, and international law (Brigit, 1996; Schmidt, 2012).

While these values are reiterated, the Global Strategy document now also addresses the necessity of a "realistic assessment of the strategic environment" and advocates for more comprehensive measures to achieve common interests and priorities. This document thus provides ample evidence to discuss a Union operating with an interest-driven logic that is as salient as its value-based one. To preempt criticisms regarding the precedence of values versus interests, the document explicitly states, "Our interests and values go hand in hand. We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, our fundamental values are embedded in our interests" (European External Action Service, 2016). The term "principled pragmatism" encapsulates the EU's approach as articulated in these statements.

Analyzing the EU's foreign policy towards Russia and Türkiye, this study contends that pragmatism in its international affairs is not a novel phenomenon for the EU but has been a consistent trend throughout its history. The oft-touted value-based foreign policy frequently amounts to mere rhetoric. The EU's pragmatic approach across various policy domains, such as migration and climate change, has been extensively examined in scholarly literature. In the same vein, its pragmatism in foreign policy has been explored both within a general conceptual framework and through the lens of specific regional policies—for instance, its engagements with Russia concerning the Ukraine crisis (Bossuyt and Elsuwege, 2021), ASEAN (Di Floristella, 2020), Central Asia (Winn and Gänzle, 2023), and the Middle East (Cebeci, 2022). These analyses consistently contend that, while the EU's rhetoric often underscores normative principles and values, its concrete policy actions are predominantly guided by strategic interests. An examination of the EU's relations with Türkiye since the late 1950s and with Russia since the 1990s reveals significant variations in the EU's approach to these two countries, contingent upon periodic conditions and interests. The primary aim of this study is to analyze the EU's relations with these two neighboring actors—Türkiye and Russia—through the lens of

pragmatism, examining both the initial stages and the subsequent evolution of these interactions. By identifying the convergences and divergences between the two cases, the study aspires to make a modest contribution to the literature on EU foreign policy and pragmatism. To this end, the study examines the EU's policies toward Türkiye and Russia, revealing how pragmatic interests have overshadowed ideological discourse.

Undoubtedly, as widely discussed in the literature, Türkiye's long-standing relationship with European integration encompasses numerous institutional, procedural, and policy-based challenges and issues (Reiners and Turhan, 2021; Bilgin, 2020; Aydin-Düzgit and Tocci, 2015; Özer and Nas, 2012, Çarkoğlu and Rubin, 2003; Müftüler-Bac, 1997). Similarly, EU-Russia relations are characterized by a multitude of dimensions and complexities (Romanova and David, 2021; Pashentsev, 2020; Casier and DeBardeleben, 2017; Maass, 2017; Futák-Campbell, 2017; Forsberg and Haukkala, 2016). Given the scope of this study, it is neither feasible nor intended to address all these elements in a comprehensive or comparative framework. Likewise, the theoretical debates surrounding the concept of pragmatism and its manifestations in EU policies represent an extensive field of inquiry. Acknowledging this broad spectrum, the study adopts a chronological framework to outline the general trends in the relationships between EU and two other case countries. The chronological scope has been deliberately expanded to underscore the persistent nature of pragmatic inclinations spanning from the EEC period to the present-day European Union.

It should be noted that there has been a protracted debate regarding whether EU governance is predominantly intergovernmental or supranational, particularly since the 1990s when the integration process gained momentum. The prevailing consensus suggests that while supranational competence is evident in certain policy areas, intergovernmentalism remains dominant in others. Despite concerted efforts, foreign policy and security issues—where national interests are prominently at play—have largely resisted a shift away from an intergovernmental policymaking framework. Consequently, some member states may adopt divergent approaches towards Russia and Türkiye, employing pragmatism within their national foreign policies. Nevertheless, the reality that a member state is mandated to adhere to a collective decision (e.g., a sanctions decision), yet states that breach such decisions are often tolerated, illustrates that, in certain instances, the Union's value-based foreign policy remains largely theoretical. Thus, it can be argued that the EU epitomizes a form of "supranational pragmatism" in its foreign policy either through its own policies or by not speaking out against the policies of its members that contradict the Union's value-based approach. In the subsequent sections, we will elucidate EU pragmatism by examining the early stages of the Union's relations with these two states in the first part and the later stages in the second part.

Türkiye and Russia were selected as case studies because they represent two strategically indispensable neighbouring powers with which the EU has developed long-term and multi-dimensional relations. Despite both being critical partners for the Union, their political systems, institutional ties with the EU, and degrees of interdependence differ substantially. This variation renders them analytically suitable for assessing whether EU pragmatism reflects partner-specific dynamics or broader structural patterns embedded in the Union's foreign policy behaviour.

Analytical Framework: Identifying the Operational Dimensions of EU Pragmatism

To move beyond descriptive accounts of EU foreign policy behaviour, this article employs a simple analytical framework that operationalizes "pragmatism" through three observable dimensions. The first dimension is the degree of divergence between the EU's stated normative commitments and its material interests. The second concerns the instrumentalization of norms—situations in which the EU selectively amplifies or downplays its value-based discourse depending on strategic considerations. The third captures patterns of asymmetric dependence management. Analysing Türkiye and Russia along these three dimensions enables a systematic comparison highlighting continuity and transformation of EU pragmatism across different periods.

This article makes three main contributions to the literature on EU foreign and security policy. First, it conceptualizes "principled pragmatism" not merely as a rhetorical label introduced in the 2016 Global Strategy, but as a recurrent and structurally embedded pattern that has shaped the EU's external behaviour since the early stages of European integration. Second, by examining Türkiye and Russia as two strategically significant but structurally different neighbouring powers, the article develops a comparative perspective that reveals how similar pragmatic logics produce divergent policy outcomes depending on the characteristics of the partner state. Third, the study advances existing scholarship by proposing an analytically usable framework that links value–interest tensions to concrete policy instruments, offering a systematic way of analysing the gap between the EU's normative discourse and its actual practices.

Foundations of Pragmatism: Early EU Engagements with Türkiye and Russia

Undoubtedly, Türkiye and Russia are two states with distinct structures, capacities, and conditions. It is therefore expected that the EU would develop different policies towards them. However, the Union's behavior towards Türkiye and Russia in the early stages of their respective relationships was remarkably similar. These parallels can be traced back to the EEC's engagement with Türkiye, which was primarily shaped by Cold War-era security imperatives and economic considerations, whereas in the case of Russia, they emerged in response to the transformed geopolitical and economic landscape of the 1990s.

EEC's Early Relations with Türkiye: Geopolitical and Economic Imperatives

Following its regional economic and political rival Greece, Türkiye applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) on 31 July 1959. In the subsequent fifteen years, two primary factors shaped the EEC's approach to Türkiye. The first was the security imperative, which aimed to prevent this geopolitically strategic country from aligning with the Soviet Union. The second was the desire of member states, which prioritized economic integration during this period, to access the Turkish market. Although the security dimension had already been addressed by Türkiye's integration into the Western bloc following the Second World War—marked by the Truman Doctrine, receiving aid from the United States, joining organizations such as the Council of Europe and NATO, and transitioning to a multi-party democratic system—Türkiye's accession

to the EEC was also perceived as a step to further solidify this alignment. In this regard, Türkiye's strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean and its NATO membership bolstered its credibility with the Community during the Cold War (Preston, 1997: 217). During this period, the EEC sought to secure Türkiye's alignment with the Western bloc through the promise of membership, thereby gaining a strategic advantage in the geopolitical dynamics of the Cold War, which represented an early manifestation of a pragmatic approach.

The economic dimension presents a more comprehensive outlook. Türkiye's application for associate membership in the EEC in 1959 culminated in the Ankara Agreement of 1963, which envisaged a long-term customs union between the two parties. During the initial phase of this customs union process, the EEC assisted Türkiye in aligning its internal economic dynamics with those of the Community. The second phase, initiated on 1 January 1973 through the Additional Protocol signed on 23 November 1970, introduced a customs reduction plan that excluded agricultural products and industrial goods which would have posed disadvantages for Türkiye. To expedite the implementation of the trade-related provisions of the second phase, the Temporary Agreement was enacted on 1 September 1971, even before the official start date of 1973.

As evidenced, the EEC took concrete steps and shaped the treaty texts in a manner that served its interests under the conditions of the 1960s and early 70s. In doing so, it articulated what Türkiye stood to gain from this partnership, although it primarily projected that Türkiye's substantive benefits would materialize in the future. Upon the signing of the Ankara Agreement, Walter Hallstein, then President of the European Commission, frequently emphasized Türkiye's status as a European state in his speeches, asserting, "and one day the last step is to be taken: Türkiye is to be a full member of the Community" (Hallstein, 1963). The preamble of the Agreement itself mentioned that the EEC's support would facilitate Türkiye's eventual accession to the Community.

Moreover, the EEC demonstrated considerable constructiveness regarding the free movement of Turkish workers within the Community, even providing a specific timetable for this in the Additional Protocol. This openness was partly due to the ongoing demand for labor from Türkiye in several Western European states at that time. While the scope of relations between the two parties was broadened to include political objectives such as Türkiye's full membership, the Ankara Agreement, in its general form, largely represented a catalog of expectations placed on Türkiye without sufficient clarity on how these expectations would be realized (Preston, 1997: 214).

To fully grasp the pragmatism inherent in the EU's relations with Türkiye, it is essential to delve into the issue of Türkiye's status as a European state. Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome stipulates that any European state may apply for membership in the Union. The Europeanness referred to here is clearly geographical, as evidenced by the rejection of Morocco's application on the grounds of its non-European status without further deliberation (European Parliament, 1998). Geographically, it is evident that only a small part of Türkiye, that is Thrace, lies within the European continent, a fact easily discernible to anyone examining a map. In the early 1960s, the EEC, which engaged Türkiye with the prospect of full membership, accepted Türkiye's geographical Europeanness without contention. Subsequently, at every opportunity—whether in response to Türkiye's

application for full membership in 1987, by designating Türkiye as a candidate country in 1999, or by initiating accession negotiations in 2005—Türkiye's geographical Europeanness has been affirmed in the EEC's/EU's official stance.

It should be noted that a significant majority within the Republic of Türkiye, whose founding ideology since 1923 has been oriented towards integration with Western civilization, view recognition as European by the European Community as a substantial achievement. The Community, through its actions in the 1960s, effectively manipulated the expectations of Turkish society and political elites to serve its own interests. In this context, it is not an exaggeration to assert that the EEC has manipulated geographical perceptions to its advantage. By promising membership to maintain its strategic interests, the EEC has consistently refrained from categorizing Türkiye as a Eurasian country.

To sum up, in the early stages of the relationship, the EEC ascribed to Türkiye a label of "Europeanness"—one that resonated favorably among broad political and social segments within the country. This narrative fostered aspirations, particularly regarding full membership and the free movement of labor. In exchange, it progressively anchored Türkiye to the Community, especially in economic terms. This approach constituted an integral component of the EEC's strategy to bind Türkiye economically and geopolitically, laying the groundwork for the enduring pragmatic tendencies that continue to characterize the EU's contemporary policies toward Türkiye.

EU's Early Relations with Russia: Navigating Post-Cold War Dynamics

Despite some efforts in the 1980s, the cooperative relationship between the Soviet Union/Russia and the EEC countries—positioned on opposing sides of the Cold War's ideological divide—could only truly commence in the 1990s. In the initial years of the post-communist period, Russia grappled with significant social and political upheaval domestically, where the most extreme views clashed to shape the country's future, thus limiting its capacity to formulate an effective foreign policy (Herrberg, 1997: 7). Within this milieu of uncertainty, a sense of Europeanism, as signaled by Gorbachev's renowned concept of the "Common European House" articulated even prior to the regime change, generated a strong sense of euphoria in post-communist Russia (Baranovsky, 2000: 447).

It is not an exaggeration to assert that the positive and warm messages of cooperation emanating from the EEC significantly influenced this optimistic sentiment on the Russian side. The EEC signed a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the Soviet Union in December 1989. Following the regime changes, the Community swiftly endeavored to establish a new relationship with Russia, aligning with its democratic and liberal transformation. Soon after the Soviet Union's dissolution on 25 December 1991, the European Commission opened a delegation in Russia in February 1991. Considering that the earliest delegations in other Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members were established in 1994, this rapid engagement underscores the special importance the EU attached to Russia. In the same year, preparations for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which aimed to foster a political dialogue as well as an economic cooperation, commenced. Under the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program, established as early as December 1990 to support the democratic and economic transformation of post-communist states, Russia received the lion's share, particularly in the early years (Commission of the EC, 1995: 21).

However, the European Commission's presentation of the aid provided to Russia in this manner does not fully reflect the reality. Under the TACIS program, between 1991 and 1999, a total of 2.24 billion ECU was allocated to Russia, which indeed constituted the highest share among CIS countries. Nevertheless, in terms of per capita aid, countries such as the Baltic states and Ukraine received greater support (European Commission, 2000: 15). This indicates that while the absolute amount of aid to Russia was substantial, it was proportionate when considered in the context of population and economic scale. Meanwhile, Russia applied for membership in the Council of Europe on 7 May 1992 and joined the organization on 28 February 1996.

Why did the EU send these positive messages and why was it so 'favourable' towards Russia in the 1990s? This favorable stance towards Russia in the 1990s can be attributed to the same underlying motivations that shaped its early interactions with Türkiye, namely its security and economic imperatives.

The EU's favorable disposition towards Russia in the 1990s was driven by strategic imperatives analogous to those shaping its early interactions with Türkiye, particularly in the realms of security and economic interests. By promoting cooperative relations and supporting Russia's democratic and economic transition, the EU sought to integrate Russia into the Western-oriented international system, thereby mitigating potential geopolitical risks in the post-Cold War era. This pragmatic approach facilitated access to Russia's substantial market while reinforcing the EU's broader objective of fostering stability in its eastern neighborhood (Commission of the EC, 1995: 23).

The security issue has influenced the EU's actions on multiple levels. Firstly, despite Russia's internal problems and relative loss of power, it was crucial not to antagonize Russia to ensure the smooth success of the enlargement process, which aimed at the accession of Central and Eastern European states to the EU. Secondly, although Russia recognized their independence in September 1991, it still maintained armies in the Baltic states until mid-1994, and had the potential to be an active party in the conflicts within the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Thirdly, Russia continued to possess a significant nuclear capability. Additionally, the establishment of the CIS allowed Russia to exert its influence even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Lastly, should Russia and other countries in the region descend into chaos, it would result in increased migration, drug trafficking, and numerous other negative consequences for the EU.

Also, Russia presented substantial potential for the Union's economic interests. The EU member states were Russia's largest trading partners, with 1993 figures showing that the trade volume between the two sides was three times that of Russia's combined trade with the USA, China, and Japan (Herrberg, 1997: 20). The EU saw significant potential in expanding these existing trade relations, establishing a foothold in Russia's transitioning market economy, and possibly leveraging this relationship to access Central Asia. In this regard, much like with Türkiye, the framework for cooperation was extensive. The PCA envisaged an economic framework that could lead to the establishment of a customs union or a free trade area, alongside the enhancement of political dialogue.

However, the broad scope, promises, and reciprocity-based arrangements did not prevent a backdrop and implementation favorable to the EU. It has been stated that the trade relations between the two sides are asymmetrical in terms of structure and proportions,

that the EU has made the conditions favourable to its own interests through methods such as anti-dumping, and that it does not serve the development of the Russian economy in this way (Leshoukov, 1998: 12-13).

As seen, just as the European Union supported Türkiye during the Cold War to secure its own safety and expand its market, in the 1990s, the Union adopted a favorable stance towards Russia to avert regional instability and security issues while pursuing economic benefits. This warm approach was largely characterized by pragmatism that safeguarded the Union's own interests, often leaving the Russian side to be appeased with promises or compelled to accept terms dictated by the EU in bilateral relations.

The concept of Europeanness pragmatically leveraged in Russia, too. For centuries, Europeans perceived Russia as a barbaric and non-European country (D'Encausse, 1998: 11-16). During the communist era, this perception was compounded by an ideological divide centered on the notion of freedom. However, in the world of 1990s, Europeanism emerged as a prominent ideal, to the extent that Jeremy Rifkin (2004) authored 'The European Dream'. Concurrently, in the Russia of 1990s, admiration for EU integration permeated political circles, the media, and parliament, with discussions about the EU experience serving as a model for the former Soviet Union territory and even speculation about Russia's potential EU membership (Leshoukov, 1998: 5). Aligning with these heightened expectations, the EU occasionally lauded Russia as a major European power (Commission of the EC, 1995: 2), flattering the Russians in a manner akin to its treatment of Türkiye. Even when Russia is referred to as Eurasian, the European side is given a positive connotation and the Asian side a negative or at least an ambiguous one (Lalumière, 1998). In the 1990s, when the EU was emerging as a robust center with a promising future, characterizing Russia as a Eurasian state effectively diminished Russia's profile, portraying it as weaker in comparison to the EU.

Evolving Pragmatism: The EU's Shifting Strategies Towards Türkiye and Russia

In the initial phase of relations, the EU engaged with Türkiye and Russia by offering grand promises aimed at securing its periodic interests and binding its counterparts to itself. However, as conditions evolved, so too did the nature of these relationships. This transformative process, which starkly reveals the EU's pragmatic approach, manifested differently in these two countries, reflecting the distinct responses of Türkiye and Russia.

Türkiye's Marginalization: The EU's Pragmatic Shift in Post-Cold War Relations

Initially, the EEC engaged closely with Türkiye, recognizing its Europeanness and offering membership as a viable prospect. However, this orientation was primarily driven by the EEC's security and economic interests. From the mid-1970s onwards, Türkiye began to lose its economic and commercial priority for the EEC. This shift was partly due to the EEC's ability to source alternative labor from North African countries and market opportunities from other states, and partly due to the economic crises within Türkiye. Consequently, the Community did not fulfill its obligations regarding the free movement of Turkish workers, which should have been granted by 1986 at the latest. Furthermore, the EEC included Greece, Portugal, and Spain in its enlargement strategy since the mid-1970s and implemented trade agreements with these states, especially in the field of

agriculture, to the detriment of Türkiye. By the mid-1980s, as the Cold War context began to weaken and the strategic importance of Türkiye came into question, the Community relegated Türkiye to a lower priority. This change was evident in the EEC's response to Türkiye's application for full membership in 1987. Not only did it take 2.5 years to reply, but it contained such harsh criticisms and excuses as to make membership very difficult.

In the 1990s, as numerous other countries emerged with aspirations to join the EU, Türkiye found itself increasingly marginalized. In an effort to reverse this trend and assert its presence, Türkiye became the first and only state to establish a customs union with the EU in the late 1995 without obtaining full membership. The EU has consistently supported the customs union initiative. For instance, in a 1995 statement, the EU Commission not only emphasized that the customs union would serve as a critical link binding Türkiye to Europe but also suggested that it would play a pivotal role in diminishing the influence of anti-Western Islamic fundamentalists within Türkiye and in curbing human rights violations (Uğur, 2007: 94). Additionally, the Association Council Decision of 6 March 1995, which delineated the terms of the customs union between the two parties, underscored that this arrangement would pave the way for Türkiye's eventual full membership (Association Council, 1995).

However, the economic impacts of the customs union have predominantly served the EU's interests. For instance, between 1996 and 2005, Türkiye's exports to the EU increased by 60%, while the EU's exports to Türkiye rose by 80%, indicating a trade balance favoring the EU (TÜİK, 2006). According to 2022 data, Türkiye's exports to the EU reached 105 billion USD, while imports amounted to 93 billion USD (WITS, 2022). The primary reason for Türkiye's trade surplus with the EU in recent years stems not from structural transformation within the country but rather from the significant devaluation of the Turkish lira, which has made exports more competitive, and the contraction of domestic demand due to high inflation, which has reduced imports. Thus, the Customs Union continues to disproportionately benefit the EU rather than Türkiye. In this respect, the Customs Union reflects the second dimension of pragmatism identified in our analytical framework: the management of asymmetric dependence.

Nevertheless, Türkiye was not granted candidate country status at the 1997 Luxembourg summit, a status which was accorded to the other 12 applicants. This status was only conferred upon Türkiye in 1999, influenced by pragmatic considerations such as Türkiye's active role in addressing issues in the Western Balkans (Buzan and Diez, 1999: 47). Although the negotiation process was initiated in 2005, it did not progress significantly. Consequently, Türkiye has become increasingly dependent on the EU through a customs union that excludes agricultural goods and the free movement of goods, with the balance of foreign trade consistently favoring the Union, precisely as the EU had envisioned.

Even in circumstances ostensibly favorable to Türkiye, the EU has managed to impose its own conditions. For instance, in October 2005, Türkiye's long-anticipated accession negotiations commenced. However, the Negotiating Framework, which was to guide these negotiations, imposed conditions detrimental to Türkiye that were not applied to any other candidate country. For example, even if Türkiye were to achieve full membership in the EU in the future, it would be restricted from benefiting temporarily or

permanently from the inclusion of agricultural goods in the customs union, the free movement of labor, and access to EU structural funds (Council of the European Union, 2005).

In the 2000s, the discourse within the EU shifted towards advocating for a privileged partnership with Türkiye, rather than full membership, a stark departure from previous membership promises. This rhetoric, coupled with the stipulations in the Negotiating Framework, indicates that even the negotiation process, during which Türkiye appeared closest to the EU, was in fact a pragmatic maneuver by the EU. In the years subsequent to the initiation of accession negotiations, numerous negotiation chapters were effectively stalled due to objections raised by member states such as Cyprus and France on various grounds. Meanwhile, little to no substantive progress has been achieved in the remaining chapters to date. At this juncture, Türkiye's significance to the EU has been reduced to that of a buffer against uncontrolled migration, a collaborator on counter-terrorism issues, and a market for duty-free EU goods. Even in the face of critical challenges to European security and stability during the 2010s, including the Arab Spring and the Ukraine Crisis, Türkiye was perceived primarily as a strategic buffer or collaborative partner rather than being considered a prospective member of the EU.

In lieu of membership-based negotiations with Türkiye, the European Union has opted to engage in issue-specific dialogues with this perennial candidate, aligning with its own priorities. For instance, under the framework of the EU-Türkiye Statement of 18 March 2016, Türkiye undertook responsibilities to prevent irregular migrants from reaching the Union's territory and to facilitate readmission. In return, the EU pledged financial assistance, visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens, acceleration of the accession process, and an update of the Customs Union. In the intervening period, while there has been a significant decrease in the number of migrants travelling to the EU via Türkiye, there has been neither an acceleration in the accession negotiations nor a revision of the Customs Union. In June 2018, the European Council acknowledged that Türkiye's accession negotiations had effectively reached an impasse. The Council also noted that no further work towards the modernization of the EU-Türkiye Customs Union was foreseen. Consequently, the EU maintained its stance on the Customs Union, aligning with its own interests, while significantly deferring the prospect of Türkiye's EU membership. Moreover, instead of relaxing visa requirements for Turkish citizens, EU member states have implemented new restrictive measures in recent years, leading to an increase in visa application rejection rates (Euronews, 2023).

Another tangible instance illustrating the European Union's altered stance towards Türkiye post-2010s is its tepid response to the coup attempt on 15 July 2016. Although the EU condemned the coup, concerns regarding the measures Türkiye implemented in its aftermath led some EU circles to advocate for excluding Türkiye, reducing financial aid, and even terminating membership negotiations. However, the EU could have assumed a more constructive and guiding role during this challenging period (Nas, 2016). This episode clearly illustrates the EU's tendency to instrumentalize its normative discourse when confronted with overriding strategic imperatives, reinforcing the pattern of selective engagement observed throughout its relations with Türkiye.

In summary, since the latter half of the 1970s, the EEC/EU has gradually distanced itself from its previously supportive and encouraging stance towards Türkiye, a shift that became more pronounced after the Cold War. The EU has consistently maintained its position as the decisive actor in bilateral relations, leveraging a pragmatic approach to keep Türkiye at a desired distance. In return, Türkiye has made significant concessions in its quest for membership, even if it has made some economic (increased direct investment, technology transfer, etc.) and political (human rights, democracy, etc.) gains.

Russia's Ascendancy and EU Pragmatism: A Shift to Strategic Rivalry

The trajectory of EU-Russia relations diverged significantly from that of Türkiye, primarily due to Russia's strategic shift in foreign policy. After navigating the turbulence of the post-communist period, Russia, under Putin's leadership from 1999 onwards, unabashedly pursued its ambition to reassert itself as a great power. This ambition was evident in its direct and indirect initiatives to project military and political influence across wider Eurasia and Europe. In the post-2000 era, Russia has strategically expanded its foreign policy maneuverability within the former Soviet Union's geography by employing a combination of soft power tools, notably in the energy sector, alongside direct and indirect hard power tactics (Matsaberidze, 2023: 53-65). These approaches have consistently led to confrontations between the European Union and Russia. Notably, Russia wielded its energy resources as a strategic tool against Europe, in ways unprecedented even during the communist era. The Russian military interventions in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine post-2014 have engendered a profound security crisis within the European Union. These actions have not only challenged the EU's strategic stability but have also necessitated a reevaluation of its foreign policy and defense mechanisms. The EU's response to Russia's aggression against Ukraine has been multifaceted, encompassing diplomatic efforts, economic sanctions, and support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity (Council of the European Union, 2024). Consequently, the EU faced a formidable interlocutor, adept at steering processes and presenting substantial challenges. Nonetheless, pragmatism remained the fundamental principle shaping the EU's (or member states') approach to this increasingly assertive Russia (Kasım, 2024: 82-84).

In examining the entire post-Cold War period, Deriglazova insightfully observed that EU-Russia relations have undergone various transformations, evolving from shared values and goals to rivalry and, ultimately, hostility (Deriglazova, 2018: 8-30). The year 1997 marked a pivotal point in the deterioration of the initial cooperative phase between the two sides. The Luxembourg summit in 1997 was particularly significant, as it initiated the enlargement of the EU to include Central and Eastern European countries. The relatively swift completion of the negotiation processes and the subsequent accession of these states into the EU contributed significantly to Russia's growing sense of unease. Additionally, the new member states of the EU harbored skepticism towards Russia, stemming from both the lingering memories of the Soviet Union and Putin's policies, which further heightened tensions (Massari, 2007: 1-15).

Similarly, NATO's Madrid summit in 1997 initiated accession negotiations with the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, culminating in their membership by March 1999. NATO's enlargement did not halt there; seven additional regional states joined the

organization in March 2004 following negotiations that began in 2002. In his widely cited 1997 article, George Kennan articulated that NATO enlargement would be a grave error for the United States. He predicted that such a move would likely "inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western, and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; impede the development of Russian democracy; revive the Cold War atmosphere in East-West relations; and propel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly unfavorable to us" (Kennan, 1997). Interestingly, 1997 was also the year the PCA came into force. However, as previously noted, the content of the PCA primarily served EU interests, exacerbating Russian discontent towards the EU.

Kennan's observations proved prescient; the NATO issue, combined with other mentioned factors, steered Russia into the 2000s with a markedly different agenda, embodied by Putin. The EU must have anticipated that Russia would react to all these steps taken against it. However, it is possible to say that both the assumption that Russia's reaction would not be effective enough and the self-confidence given by the Europeanism, which we say peaked in the 1990s, led it to take these steps. Whatever the EU's motives, Russia's return has been faster and more dynamic than expected. Since then, EU-Russia relations have never regained the optimism of the 1990s. The EU has continued to be pragmatic in its foreign policy, but this time it has recalibrated its pragmatism against a formidable opponent, rather than against an opponent that dictates the rules of the game.

In this new form, EU pragmatism has become increasingly apparent in 2000s. This was first evident in the Union's response to Chechnya issue. Although the EU claimed that Russia was violating human rights in Chechnya, to avoid conflicts with a strategic partner like Russia, the EU readily compromised its normative stance on human rights and failed to take a decisive stand against Russia, aside from some ineffective measures (Forsberg and Herd, 2005: 455-478). Senior officials from various EU member states demonstrated, through their statements and policies, that a dual approach towards Russia could be considered "normal". For instance, Angela Merkel's administration in Germany did not hesitate to criticize Russia over Chechnya and human rights violations, yet continued to cooperate in energy and economic sectors. Similarly, Italy's government placed special emphasis on energy cooperation with Russia (Massari, 2007: 5). Perhaps the most candid acknowledgment of this pragmatism was made by French President Jacques Chirac during the EU summit in Finland in October 2006. Referring to relations with Russia, he remarked, "There is trade, on one hand, and then there are human rights. They should be treated separately" (Spinant, 2006). Beyond the major EU states, several others—including Greece, Cyprus, Finland, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria—have also fostered close cooperation with Russia in areas such as energy, trade, security, and culture (David, Gower & Haukkala, 2011: 183). It is noteworthy that President Putin has adeptly exploited bilateral engagements with individual EU member states to foster divisions within the Union (Michta, 2022: 189). His pragmatic approach has, in turn, highlighted the EU's own pragmatism, often revealing that its professed idealism remains largely rhetorical. Taken together, the EU's muted reaction to Chechnya demonstrates a selective application of norms driven by geopolitical considerations, constituting a core empirical manifestation of principled pragmatism.

As time has progressed, the dynamics of EU-Russia relations have shifted significantly. Supranational European integration has been severely undermined by the challenges of

the large-scale enlargement, the repercussions of the 2008 economic crisis, outward migration, and the rise of populism. Concurrently, Russia has enhanced its multilateral maneuvering and capacity-building across a broader spatial area, solidifying its position as a more influential global power, particularly in energy and trade. Consequently, the EU's overarching strategy towards Russia has become more cautious and, in fact, less effective. In 2008, attempts to establish a regional balance against Russia through soft policy instruments like the Eastern Partnership, initiated shortly after the Georgian conflict, also proved insufficient. The EU, striving to secure a foothold in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, found itself disadvantaged in these regions compared to Russia, which it had attempted to manipulate in bilateral relations just a decade or so earlier (Fernandes and Simão, 2010).

Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU was compelled to demonstrate its value-based approach more tangibly by imposing increasingly expansive sanctions on Russia. Nevertheless, a pragmatism that prioritizes the interests of Union members has once again prevailed, resulting in a widening gap between decisions and their implementation. As emphasized in a comprehensive study edited by Bossuyt and Elsuwege, since the emergence of critical developments such as the Ukrainian Revolution, the annexation of Crimea, and the conflict in the Donbas region in 2013–2014, the EU has consistently grappled with a pronounced divergence between its normative principles and pragmatic interests in areas such as energy, migration, and regional security. Notably, its strategic interests have frequently taken precedence over its espoused values (Bossuyt and Elsuwege, 2021). This inconsistency was acknowledged in a resolution by the European Parliament itself (European Parliament, 2023). Although Russia's oil and gas export revenues declined in 2022 due to sanctions, the trend reversed in 2023, with Russia earning $532 billion in fossil fuel export revenues, $178 billion of which came from EU members (European Parliament, 2023). Russia experienced record increases in coal and natural gas production and continued to trade with EU members through third countries. Individual member states have similarly continued to reveal their pragmatic approaches in their dealings with Russia. For instance, Germany, a prominent member of the Union, demonstrated a prioritization of economic interests over human rights concerns through its support for the Nord Stream 2 project, despite widespread criticism (Reuters, 2021). In this context, the post-2014 sanctions regime reveals a persistent tension between normative commitments and deep-rooted energy interdependence, thereby illustrating the first analytical dimension of this study: value–interest divergence.

In the 2016 Strategy Paper, where the approach of principled pragmatism was introduced, specific attention was given to relations with Russia. While the document characterises Russia's activities in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as illegal and unacceptable, yet also acknowledged the interdependence between the EU and Russia: "We will therefore engage Russia to discuss disagreements and cooperate if and when our interests overlap." It further articulated the intent for selective engagement with Russia on a diverse array of issues, ranging from climate change to education, research, and cross-border cooperation (European External Action Service, 2016: 33). At a time when economic sanctions were imposed by the EU in response to Russia's actions in Crimea in 2014 and when relations appeared particularly strained, it was argued that the language used in the document was

aimed at “appeasement” (Mihalache, 2016: 4). The statements in this document alone show the internal inconsistency of the EU’s stance towards Russia. Taken together, and when framed through a systematic analytical lens, these developments allow this article to contribute to a growing literature that critically re-evaluates the EU’s self-portrayal as a normative power. The findings suggest that pragmatic behaviour is an enduring structural feature of EU external action, with variation shaped by partner-specific configurations of interdependence and geopolitical leverage.

Conclusion

The excessive importance unilaterally placed on relations with the EU has rendered Türkiye relatively passive in terms of formulating alternative foreign policy strategies. Türkiye’s adherence to Europeanism in its foreign policy was perhaps understandable within the context of the Cold War era. However, in the evolving political landscape of the post-Cold War period, the continued pursuit of EU membership without seeking substantial alternatives has left the country in a position of considerable uncertainty vis-à-vis the EU. This is largely attributable to the fact that the EU has consistently dictated the direction and intensity of relations according to its own interests over more than 65 years of bilateral engagement. Türkiye’s inertia in adapting its strategy and developing alternatives has arguably facilitated this pragmatic approach by the EU.

The EU has consistently adopted a pragmatic approach in its relations with Russia as well. However, due to the distinct nature of the Russian state, the EU often found it challenging to impose its interests. In the 1990s, Russia capitalized on its status as an underestimated Eurasian power to craft alternative foreign policy maneuvers. Arguably, one of the most desirable foreign policy profiles for the EU in the 2000s would have been to emulate Russia, not geographically but in terms of political influence, as a Eurasian power. The balance between the two sides has progressively tilted in favor of Russia, which has gained a psychological upper hand due to the stagnation of European integration. While the European Union can, for instance, criticise Türkiye for its anti-democratic actions and apply sanctions, such as suspending accession negotiations, it has often been unable to move beyond criticism regarding Russia's human rights violations and military interventions against other states. When concrete sanctions were unavoidable, the EU implemented measures that, in practice, were often ineffective. As issues originating from Russia, such as the Ukraine conflict, have escalated, the EU’s responses, ostensibly emphasizing human rights, have often amounted to little more than lip service. The EU, frequently overlooking sanctions violations by its member states or issuing mere warnings, has demonstrated a supranational pragmatism that often contravenes its own idealistic and value-oriented stance.

In conclusion, the European Union has engaged with both countries through pragmatic strategies shaped by periodic imperatives. While the initial drivers of EU pragmatism toward these nations exhibited notable similarities, the divergent attitudes and expectations of each country vis-à-vis the EU in subsequent phases resulted in the distinct evolution of the substance and application of EU pragmatism.

References

Almeder, R. (1986). A Definition of Pragmatism. *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 3(1), 79-87.

Aydin-Düzgit, S. and Tocci, N. (2015). *Turkey and the European Union*. London: Red Globe Press.

Bilgin, A. A. (ed.) (2020). *EU/Turkey Relations in the Shadows of Crisis – A Break up or Revival?*, Lanham: Lexington Books.

Association Council (1995). Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council of 22 December 1995 On Implementing the Final Phase of the Customs Union. Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 35/1, 13 February 1995.

Badell, D. (2020). The EU, Migration and Contestation: the UN Global Compact for Migration, from Consensus to Dissensus. *Global Affairs*, 6(4-5), 347-362.

Baranovsky, V. (2000). Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe? *International Affairs*, 76 (3), 443-458.

Bauer, H. and Brighi, E. (2009). *Pragmatism in International Relations*. Oxon: Routledge.

Bossuyt, F. and Van Elsuwege, P. (2021). *Principled Pragmatism in Practice – The EU's Policy towards Russia after Crimea*. Leiden: Brill Nijhoff.

Brigit, L. (1996). The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 34(1), 81-102.

Buzan B. and Diez, T. (1999). The European Union and Turkey. *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 41(1), 41-57.

Casier, T. and DeBardeleben, J. (eds.) (2017). *EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions*. London: Routledge.

Cebeci, M. (2022). The EU's Constructions of the Middle East. In Bouris, D. et al (eds.). *Routledge Handbook of EU-Middle East Relations* (pp.70-80). London: Routledge.

Cochran, M. (2012). Pragmatism and International Relations - A Story of Closure and Opening. *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, 4(1), 138-158.

Commission of the EC. (1995). Communication from the Commission – The European Union and Russia: The Future Relationship. COM (95) 223 Final, Brussels. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:51995DC0223

European Commission. (2000). TACIS Programme Annual Report 1999. COM (2000) 835 Final, Brussels. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52000DC0835

Council of the European Union. (2024). "EU Response to Russia's War of Aggression against Ukraine", 16 December 2024. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine/

Council of the European Union. (2018). Outcome of Proceeding, 26 June 2018, 10555/18, Brussels.

Council of the European Union. (2005). Enlargement Accession Negotiations with Turkey: General EU Position. 12 October 2005, 12823/1/05, Brussels.

Çarkoğlu, A. and Rubin, B. (eds.). (2003). *Turkey and the European Union – Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*. London: Routledge.

D'Encausse, H. C. (1998). Russia and Europe in a Historical Context. Is Russia a European Power? In: Casier, T. and Malfliet, K. (eds.), *The Position of Russia in a New Europe* (pp. 11-16). Leuven: Leuven University Press.

Di Floristella, A. P. (2020). Reconciling Pragmatism with Idealism in the European Union's Security Cooperation with ASEAN. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 42(2), 174-199.

David, M., Gower, J. and Haukkala, H. (2011). Introduction: The European Union and Russia. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, 19(2), 183-188.

Deriglazova, L. V. (2018). Russia and the European Union in Eulerian Circles of "Europe". *Russia in Global Affairs*, 16(4), 8-30.

Euronews (2023). "Türkiye'den Schengen Vizesi Başvurularına Ret Oranı Neden Arttı? Schengen Ülkeleri Ne Diyor?". Available at: https://tr.euronews.com/2023/07/04/turkiyeden-schengen-vizesi-basvurularina-ret-orani-neden-artti-schengen-ulkeleri-ne-diyor

European External Action Service (2016). Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe - A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/eugs_review_web_0.pdf

European Parliament (2023). Effectiveness of the EU Sanctions on Russia. 9 November 2023, 2023/2905(RSP). Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/delegations/en/the-effectiveness-of-the-eu-sanctions-on/product-details/20240718DPU39112

European Parliament (1998). Briefing No.23: Legal Questions of Enlargement. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/briefings/23a2_en.htm#B7

Fernandes, S. and Simão, L. (2010). Competing for Eurasia: Russian and European Union Perspectives. In: Freire, M. R. and Kanet, R. E. (eds.), *Key Players and Regional Dynamics in Eurasia* (pp. 103-125). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Forsberg, T. and Haukkala, H. (2016). *The European Union and Russia*. London: Red Globe Press.

Forsberg, T. and Herd, G. P. (2005). The EU, Human Rights, and the Russo-Chechen Conflict. *Political Science Quarterly*, 120(3), 455-478.

Futák-Campbell, B. (2017). *Practising EU Foreign Policy: Russia and the Eastern Neighbours*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hallstein, W. (1963). Address by Professor Dr. Walter Hallstein, President of the Commission of the European Economic Community, on the Occasion of the Signature of

the Association Agreement with Turkey. Ankara, 12 September 1963. Available at: https://aei.pitt.edu/14311/1/S77.pdf

Herrberg, A. (1997). The European Union and Russia: Towards a New Ostpolitik? Aalborg University. European Research Unit. Available at: https://vbn.aau.dk/files/41750982/no21europeanstudiesantjeherrberg_.pdf

Kasım, K. (2024). Karadeniz'de Güvenlik Bağlamında Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı, In: Bilgin, M. S. (eds.), *Türkiye'nin Jeopolitiği ve Karadeniz'in Güvenliği Ekseninde Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşı* (pp. 173-197). Ankara: Akçağ Yayınları.

Kennan, G. F. (1997). A Fateful Error. *New York Times*, 5 February 1997. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/opinion/a-fateful-error.html

Lalumière, C. (1998). Report on the Commission Communication Entitled 'The Future of Relations between the European Union and Russia' and the Action Plan 'The European Union and Russia: The Future Relationship. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, 12 February 1998.

Leshoukov, I. (1998). Beyond Satisfaction: Russia's Perspectives on European Integration. Center for European Integration Studies. Discussion Paper. Available at: https://aei.pitt.edu/335/1/dp_c26_leshoukov.pdf

Maass, A. S. (2017). *EU-Russia Relations, 1999-2015 – From Courtship to Confrontation*. London: Routledge.

Massari, M. (2007). Russia and the EU Ten Years On: A Relationship in Search of Definition. *The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs*, 42(1), 1-15.

Matsaberidze, D. (2023). Competing Strategies: The Russian Federation vs. the European Union and the United States through Georgia and Ukraine. *Connections: The Quarterly Journal*, 22(1), 53-65.

Mihalache, I. (2016). Principled Pragmatism in EU Foreign Policy: A Return to Realpolitik or Rapprochement with Russia. Centre for Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies, 08 September 2016. Available at: http://cgsrs.org/publications/80

Michta, A. A. (2022). At a Strategic Crossroads: The West Confronted by Russia and China. In: Šrāders, S. and Terry, G. S. (eds.), *A Restless Embrace of the Past?* (pp. 186-195). Tartu: University of Tartu Press.

Müftüler-Bac, M. (1997). *Europe in Change - Turkey's Relations with a Changing Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Nas, Ç. (2016). Darbe Girişimi Sonrasında Türkiye-AB İlişkileri: Türkiye'nin AB'li Geleceği Açısından Çıkarımlar, İKV Değerlendirme Notu, İktisadi Kalkınma Vakfı.

Özer, Y. and Nas, Ç. (eds.) (2012). *Turkey and the European Union – Processes of Europeanisation*. London: Routledge.

Pashentsev, E. (eds.) (2020). *Strategic Communication in EU-Russia Relations: Tensions, Challenges and Opportunities*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Preston, C. (1997). *Enlargement and Integration in the European Union*. London: Routledge.

Reuters (2021). "Germany Defends Nord Stream 2 Pipeline Deal with Russia". Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/germany-defends-nord-stream-2-pipeline-deal-with-russia-2021-07-21/

Reiners, W. and Turhan, E. (eds.) (2021). *EU-Turkey Relations – Theories, Institutions and Policies*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Rifkin, J. (2004). *The European Dream*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Romanova, T. and David, M. (eds.) (2021). *The Routledge Handbook of EU-Russia Relations: Structures, Actors, Issues*. London: Routledge.

Schmidt, V. A. (2012). Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union. In: Jones, E. et al (eds.). *The Oxford Handbook of the European Union* (pp. 661-675). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Spinant, D. (2006). Putin and the 'Old Man' Spoil Lahti Summit. *Politico*, 25 October 2006. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/putin-and-the-old-man-spoil-lahti-summit/

TÜİK (2006). *Dış Ticaret İstatistikleri 1996-2005*. Ankara: Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu.

Uğur, M. (2007). *Avrupa Birliği ve Türkiye- Bir Dayanak/İnandırıcılık İkilemi*, 3. Basım, Istanbul: Agora Kitaplığı.

Von Lucke, F. (2021). Principled Pragmatism in Climate Policy? The EU and Changing Practices of Climate Justice. *Political Geography*, 86, 1-10.

Winn, N. and Gänzle, S. (2023). Recalibrating EU Foreign Policy Vis-à-vis Central Asia: Towards Principled Pragmatism and Resilience. *Geopolitics*, 28(3), 1342-1361.

Wood, S. (2011). Pragmatic Power EUrope? *Cooperation and Conflict*, 46(2), 242–261.

WITS (2022). Turkey Trade Statistics 2022. World Integrated Trade Solution. Available at: https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/TUR/Year/2022/TradeFlow/EXPIMP#